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Pros
 Trade unions under certain bargaining structures 
can have favorable macro consequences by being 
less aggressive in their wage bargaining.
 Trade unions can have favorable micro outcomes 
by stimulating worker voice.
 Trade unions can facilitate contracting where 
there are benefits to a long-term relationship 
between the employer and the worker.
 Trade unions have historically reduced wage 
inequality.
 There has been a reversal of adverse union effects, 
where observed.
ELEVAToR PiTCh
The micro- and macroeconomic effects of the declining 
power of trade unions have been hotly debated by 
economists and policymakers. Nevertheless, the empirical 
evidence shows that the impact of the decline on economic 
aggregates and firm performance is not an overwhelming 
cause for concern. However, the association of declining 
union power with rising earnings inequality and a loss 
of direct communication between workers and firms 
is potentially more worrisome. This in turn raises the 
questions of how supportive contemporary unionism 
is of wage solidarity, and whether the depiction of the 
nonunion workplace as an authoritarian “bleak house” is 
more caricature than reality.
AUThoR’s MAin MEssAGE
To the extent that unions have been found to have negative effects on net, their decline might be deemed no cause 
for concern. However, even in these circumstances, “on net” is not a sufficient guide for policy. Rather than a hands-
off approach, the general goal should be to stimulate value-enhancing choices by firms and workers, while limiting the 
downside of rent-seeking.
Cons
 Trade union monopoly power is bad, and its 
exercise may lead to a misallocation of resources.
 The basis of pro-productive union effects is vague 
while there exist alternative, non-union voice 
mechanisms.
 Governance procedures are not exclusive to union 
regimes and by design may lower rent-seeking 
behavior injurious to firm performance.
 Unions may no longer reduce wage inequality or 
support redistributive policies.
 Reductions in union power may directly underpin 
a reduction in the disadvantages of unionism.
The consequences of trade union power erosion
Declining union power would not be an overwhelming cause for 
concern if not for rising wage inequality and the loss of worker voice
Keywords: union density/coverage, bargaining structure, coordination, macro/micro performance,  
redistribution, voice 
KEY FindinGs
Source: ICTWSS Database. Online at: http://uva-aias.net /208.
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MoTiVATion
Union density is in retreat. Data for 25 advanced countries indicate that union 
density has fallen in 24 out of 25 countries over the last 20 years, and in 23 out of 
24 countries in the last 30 years. Even if we cannot yet speak of convergence—the 
Nordic countries being the main outliers—there has been an unambiguous decline 
in unionism. Sustained decline can be equated with a diminution in union power, 
despite pockets of union strength.
This paper discusses the consequences of this erosion along macroeconomic and 
microeconomic contours. Although the evidence on union effects is mixed, it can 
be argued that union decline may give little immediate cause for concern. Even 
so, two indicators typically associated with union decline—heightened earnings 
inequality and a potential shortfall in employee voice—occasion more concern.
disCUssion oF PRos And Cons
Collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance
In discussing the macroeconomic effects of unions, it has been conventional to 
draw a distinction between union membership, union coverage and bargaining 
structure. Union membership refers to union density, the fraction of the workforce 
that is organized. Union coverage refers to the fraction of the workforce that is 
covered by collective agreements. The latter proportion generally exceeds the 
former because wages negotiated by unions are often applied to non-union workers 
via extension agreements. Bargaining structure refers to the level at which wages 
are determined. It ranges from decentralized bargaining at firm level, through 
intermediate bargaining arrangements (agreements between industry-wide unions 
and employers’ associations that establish a floor of wages at the industry level), 
to centralized bargaining procedures (negotiations between labor and employer 
confederations that set national wage norms).
The three “systems” may be said to apply in Anglo-Saxon, continental European 
and Nordic nations, respectively, although membership and typology are more 
fluid than this. Moreover, a given structure can mask differences in the practice 
of collective bargaining, such as the degree to which there is coordination in 
bargaining.
From the outset, union density and union coverage were associated with adverse 
outcomes in contrast with initially more favorable results for bargaining structure 
and coordination. Focusing on the latter, one important study found evidence of 
a non-linear relation between bargaining level and the change in employment/
unemployment, as well as the Okun Index (the inflation rate plus the unemployment 
rate), when comparing the period 1965–1973 with 1974–1985 [1]. Others, however, 
reported that countries with coordinated bargaining structure experienced relatively 
lower equilibrium unemployment rates, although typically the fitted relation was 
now linear (rather than hump-shaped).
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A modern review of the coordination literature, embracing the various elements 
of bargaining structure, examines 28 studies, which it breaks down into 174 sub-
studies (where the unit of analysis is the relationship between a specific measure of 
bargaining coordination and an individual performance measure) [2]. Abstracting 
from whether the associations are linear or non-linear, on a simple head count 45% 
of the sub-studies support the view that coordination works—either by lowering 
price inflation, unemployment (or a conflation of the two), or by raising employment 
and productivity, among other things. But the results vary considerably by outcome 
indicator. Critically, the more sophisticated the estimation technique, the more 
elusive the empirical relationship between bargaining coordination and economic 
performance. Another result is that coordination benefits, where observed, are 
more likely in the 1970s and 1980s than the 1990s. Further, while initially it was 
thought that coordinated systems were better able to react to or otherwise absorb 
shocks, more recent research discounts this purported dynamic benefit, although 
bargaining coordination may well mitigate the harmful effect of union density on 
unemployment.
On balance, then, union density and union coverage are associated with unfavorable 
outcomes, while coordination points more to a reduction in the disadvantages of 
(strong) unionism than indicating a direct effect on the economic aggregates.
All this is rather thin gruel. But an interesting recent development—the contingency 
hypothesis—argues that the success of coordination/centralization is contingent on 
the governance capacity of the bargaining parties at higher levels to bind lower levels 
(so-called vertical coordination). This ability is captured by state-based provisions 
for the legal enforceability of collective agreements and a peace obligation during the 
validity of a collective agreement. Centralized and/or coordinated wage bargaining, 
so the argument runs, can only be expected to deliver the macroeconomic goods 
in conjunction with a high degree of bargaining governability. There is some cross-
section empirical evidence favoring this contingency hypothesis in terms of lower 
inflation and labor costs. That said, it is not clear that governance capacity is the 
chief enabling factor here, as opposed to, say, the stance of monetary policy.
But what of the Nordic model? The four main Nordics—Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, and Finland—still record high levels of union density coupled with low 
unemployment, low income inequality, and generally favorable productivity and 
unit cost development. However, despite the important role played by unions in 
the Nordic countries, there is little separate empirical evidence as to their specific 
influence (relative to other institutions) on economic performance. Also, despite 
its current popularity as a potential model for other countries, the Nordic model 
has not always been alluring. (It will be recalled that the Nordic countries had 
their financial crisis in the 1990s.) There are also material differences between the 
individual Nordic states. Thus, Sweden and Denmark have seen the emergence of 
more decentralized regimes based on more flexible wage structures than before, as 
well as a reordering of economic priorities. This restructuring has received insufficient 
attention in the economics literature. Finally, the Nordics are characterized by 
highly institutionalized social dialogues between the labor market organizations 
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and public representatives at all levels. This privileged position of the unions in 
relation to public policy making and its implementation sharply differentiates this 
bloc from most other nations.
Collective bargaining and microeconomic performance
From the perspective of micro theory, union decline again poses a mix of positive 
and negative elements. The conventional monopoly theory of unions sees their 
effects as unabashedly negative. Viewed as combinations in restraint of trade, 
unions introduce distortions into what would otherwise be efficient labor markets. 
They distort labor market outcomes owing to the increase in compensation above 
competitive levels, and they impose deadweight losses. To these losses in welfare, 
it is conventional to add the output costs stemming from the union rule-book and 
reduced management discretion.
But there is a countervailing face of unions that emphasizes their value-enhancing 
effects. The chief exponents of this collective voice view of unionism note the 
ambiguity introduced by long-term attachments between the firm and much of 
its labor force for the efficiency properties of the standard quit or exit mechanism 
[3]. The firm’s reliance on quits to extract information relevant to the design of 
an efficient mix of wages and working conditions may introduce inefficiencies by 
focusing on the preferences of the marginal worker rather than those of older, 
more stable, and potentially more valuable employees. As a result, voice or direct 
communication between the worker and the firm fulfils the role of bringing actual 
and desired conditions closer together. Crucial to this argument is that many working 
conditions are public goods, with the implication that they will be underprovided 
without some form of collective agency, at all times equated in this model with 
autonomous unions.
More generally, the collective voice model emphasizes the importance of the 
quality of labor relations. Good labor relations are viewed as more likely to produce 
positive performance outcomes, and vice versa. Finally, the model also recognizes 
the shock that unions and union wages can impart to inefficient management, 
providing it with the incentive to tighten up on work standards and alter methods 
of production.
Thus, there are a number of (largely) informational channels through which unionism 
as the instrument of collective voice can improve the operation of the workplace, 
their most tangible manifestation being a reduction in quits, all things being 
equal. But there is also the issue of governance. Here the collective voice model is 
consistent with modern contract theory, wherein governance refers to the policing 
and/or monitoring of incomplete employment contracts. Assuming that unions 
make it easier (less costly) to negotiate and administer a governance apparatus, 
they may be expected to facilitate long-term efficient contracting in a number 
of ways. Thus, a union specializing in information about the contract and in the 
representation of workers can prevent employers from behaving opportunistically. 
One fly in the ointment, however, is that the governance argument also depends on 
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(union monopoly) power that, while necessary to make credible the employer’s ex 
ante promises, also gives rise to a bargaining power or hold-up problem.
Empirical evidence for the US, surveyed in an influential review, does not encourage 
a sanguine view of this modern perspective of unionism [4]. First, as far as the 
keynote productivity variable is concerned, union effects are close to zero on 
average, and at most modestly positive. Second, unions have little direct effect on 
productivity growth; the lower growth of union firms, after controlling for union–
non-union differences in capital and other factors of production, is the consequence 
of their being located in slower-growing sectors (but see below). Third, the findings 
with respect to profitability are of concern. In one sense, a negative profitability 
effect is to be expected, given a substantial union wage premium in conjunction 
with a close-to-zero productivity effect. And virtually all US studies point to lower 
profitability in union regimes, irrespective of the profit measure used. At issue, 
however, is the source of the union gain. If the process is merely a redistributive 
effect, there are no implications for efficiency. But there is little to suggest that 
concentration-related profits are an important source of the gain. More potent 
sources are current earnings associated with limited foreign competition and 
growing firm/industry demand. Fourth, even greater concern is occasioned by 
union effects on investments in tangible (i.e. investment) and intangible (research 
and development, or R&D) capital. US research indicates that unions capture some 
share of the quasi rents that make up the normal returns on investment in long-
lived capital and R&D. Firms rationally seek to limit their exposure to this hold-up 
problem, most obviously by cutting back on these investments. There are both 
direct and indirect union effects: The former are caused by the union wage tax, 
while the latter stem from the reduction in profits (relevant because of imperfect 
capital markets). Finally, lower profits and investment are manifested in lower 
employment growth, although infrequently in higher failure rates.
In a rare departure from these pessimistic findings, one US study examining the 
effects on labor productivity of various working practices, information technology, 
and management procedures in conjunction with unionism offers a brighter 
scenario [5]. Specifically, it reports that a hypothetical union plant embracing 
benchmarking and total quality management, with 50% of its workers meeting on 
a regular basis (a measure of employee involvement), and operating profit-sharing 
for its non-managerial employees, would have 13.5% higher labor productivity than 
a non-union plant with none of these practices. By contrast, the corresponding 
differential for a high-performance non-union plant is put at only 4.5%. An 
important qualification, however, is the word “hypothetical,” since such innovative 
union plants constitute a tiny share of union workplaces in the study sample.
To what extent do the negative US results carry over to other countries? After all, 
most studies confirm that the US union premium is unusually high compared with 
that in other countries.
Cross-country surveys do in fact often report different results for other countries. 
In particular, the innovation results and (to a lesser extent) the profit results are 
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generally not found for other nations. Given that the data in these studies are 
rather dated, however, this section can be concluded with some updated results 
for Britain and Germany, along with some brief remarks on the possible variation 
in performance across different unionized settings.
The British case is interesting because of the shift in the impact of British unions in 
the 1990s and beyond compared with the 1980s. One study maps changes in the 
impact of British unions at a time when union density almost halved—from 53% in 
1979 to 28% in 1999 [6]. It provides clear evidence of a diminution in the negative 
effects of unions on wages, financial performance and productivity through 
time. By the same token, certain other unfavorable effects of unions are shown 
to persist, including slower employment growth and elevated absenteeism. The 
study’s overall assessment that there has been a reduction in the disadvantages of 
unionism rather than a reversal is echoed in much of the British literature, although 
the evidence for profitability at least has been argued as more in line with a straight 
reversal of past effects.
After US and British research, union and worker representation effects on 
performance have perhaps been most studied for Germany. Research has focused 
more on works council than union effect, although recently the two have been 
examined together (appropriately so, given the dual system of industrial relations in 
that country, with collective bargaining typically being conducted at industry level 
and worker representation at plant level through the agency of works councils). 
German works councils are the exemplars of collective voice, given their statutory 
rights (to information, consultation, and codetermination) and constraints (they 
cannot bargain about terms usually fixed under collective agreements at industry 
level, and they cannot engage in strike action). But the breadth of their authority 
inevitably conveys power, and how this is exercised will determine their effects on 
performance. Again, theory does not provide an unambiguous answer.
Recent studies exploiting large nationally representative data sets often present a 
more optimistic picture than the earlier literature. Thus, there is some indication 
that the effect of works councils on firm productivity and even innovation may 
be positive if the entity is firmly embedded in the dual system (i.e. covered by a 
sectoral agreement). However, with the pronounced decline in unionism, German 
sectoral collective bargaining has significantly decentralized, and works councils 
have come to enjoy formal bargaining rights. The jury is still out as to whether 
the new bargaining role of works councils has been manifested in more active 
rent-seeking. In these circumstances, ambitious policy recommendations for other 
nations to adopt this institution may be especially premature.
Finally, as a wide-ranging British study indicated some time ago, high-performance 
practices are not distinctive with respect to unionism [7]. Further, the subsequent 
literature cannot be said to have uncovered a well-determined hierarchy for firm 
performance (or a blueprint for the future of unions) because of the ambiguity 
surrounding the costs of the practices in question, as well as profound causality 
issues associated with the unobserved timing of these transforming industrial 
relations practices.
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Equity considerations: The earnings distribution and worker voice
Their redistributive function has sometimes led to unions being described as a 
sword of justice. Also, apart from the issue of industrial democracy, workers possess 
valuable private information that is more likely to be disclosed under collective 
action. Might not the decline in unionism therefore have worrisome implications 
for inequality and worker voice?
The definitive modern comparative study investigating unions and wage inequality 
in the US, the UK, and Canada from the early 1980s to 2001 reaches three main 
conclusions [8]. First, unions tend to reduce inequality in all three countries among 
male workers, whose union coverage tends to be concentrated in the middle of 
the skill distribution and whose wages tend to be compressed relative to those of 
non-union workers. Second, unions do not reduce wage inequality among females 
because (a) women, unlike men, are concentrated in the upper end of the wage 
distribution and (b) the union wage premium is not only greater for women but 
also greater for higher-skilled women. Finally, the decline in union density and the 
wage differential has resulted in a steady decline in the equalizing effect of unions 
for males but had little effect for females.
If the size of the union sector and the absence of extension mechanisms in these 
three countries make it easier it to compare the structure of wages for workers 
whose wages are determined by union contracts and those whose wages are 
not, other studies have nevertheless confirmed the same basic tendencies. Thus, 
for example, a very recent comparative study of Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) nations confirms that over the interval 1975–
1995 countries witnessing relatively large declines in unionization also experienced 
relatively large increases in earnings inequality, as measured by changes in the 90:10 
percentile earnings ratio [9]. After 1995, however, no such association is evident in 
the data. This divergence provides the starting-point for an examination of the 
link between changes in redistribution (measured by the percentage change in the 
Gini coefficient produced by taxation and income transfers) and changes in union 
density. A regression of the change in redistribution on the change in union density 
indicates a positive and statistically significant effect of unionism for the sample 
period 1980–1995. During this period, increasing unionism seems to have exerted 
pressure on governments to redistribute, and vice versa. For the interval 1995–2010, 
however, the coefficient estimate for the change in union density is negative and 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that changes in union density were no longer 
linked to redistribution. By way of explanation, it is reported that union decline 
in many OECD nations since the 1970s has been accompanied by changes in the 
position of union members in the income distribution. It is conjectured that, since 
the average union member has become better off as union density has declined, 
union members have become less supportive of wage solidarity and redistributive 
policies. Thus, the inequality problem may remain, but the role of unions is more 
controversial.
This fascinating study is suggestive rather than definitive. It requires more work, 
as do two other issues linked to inequality that can only be raised here briefly. 
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First, just how equalizing is equalizing once unemployment is taken into account? 
Second, what are the longer-term efficiency consequences of compression?
Perhaps we are on firmer ground in speaking of a shortfall of worker voice in the 
wake of union decline. This topic has generated much debate in the US because 
of (a) its vanguard position in that retreat, (b) the collective voice model, and (c) 
the results of large-scale surveys indicating that workers desire more voice and 
influence in the workplace.
Although firms in competitive labor markets may undersupply voice, it does not 
follow that autonomous unionism is the remedy, either from a worker perspective 
(where workers seek non-adversarial representation) or the practical interest of 
fostering higher productivity. Here a case can be made for company unionism—
including non-union employee involvement/representation programs, joint plant 
councils, and alternative dispute resolution programs—which holds out the 
prospect of greater collective voice for workers without the negative monopoly 
effect of unionism. Legal niceties largely rule this out in the US (witness the recent 
Volkswagen case in Tennessee), but British research suggests that employer-created 
non-union forms offer the prospects of meeting the aspirations of workers, and 
yield gains to workers and firms alike.
Indeed, the most recent research for Britain has found that the decline in union 
voice has been accompanied by a significant expansion in non-union voice, such 
that the overall coverage of voice mechanisms has remained high and stable [10]. 
In short, British employers have thus chosen non-union voice rather than opt for 
no voice at all. Moreover, comparing voice regimes, non-union voice outperforms 
union voice for a variety of perceived-outcome indicators—industrial relations 
climate, productivity, and financial performance—if not quits. This gives credence 
to the notion that management has an incentive to invest in non-union voice, even 
if this optimistic scenario is muddied by comparisons between voice types.
LiMiTATions And GAPs
Despite the wealth of evidence reviewed here, it pertains only to OECD countries and, 
within that firmament, the majority of studies cover Anglo-Saxon countries, whose 
experiences may differ in important respects from the rest. The representativeness 
of the results is therefore in question. Also our understanding of the relationships 
uncovered in the existing sample of countries is often fragile. Examples are the 
difficulty of measuring levels of and changes in bargaining structure, and the 
ambiguity surrounding transforming industrial relations practices and firm 
performance. Issues of causality loom particularly large. Many of the relationships 
examined here are descriptive and have a basis in cross-section analysis. There is a 
pressing need for use of better data at the micro level allowing controls for firm and 
worker fixed effects, in the absence of which spurious attributions of the direction 
of causality are all too easily made.
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sUMMARY And PoLiCY AdViCE
Unions have both beneficial and harmful effects in theory.
Union density/coverage is associated with adverse macro outcomes, and 
bargaining structure/coordination no longer appears to have a direct effect on 
performance (although it may moderate the harmful effects associated with the 
former indicators). The potential of bargaining discipline awaits formal validation.
At the micro level, apart from near-universal negative findings for the US, findings 
for other countries are more nuanced. For its part, the British evidence points 
to a decline in the disadvantages of unionism rather than a simple reversal of 
unionism’s negative effects. The recherché notion, encountered in US and British 
literatures, that adopting transforming industrial relations practices enables union 
firms to outcompete non-union firms with the same set of practices requires 
validation. And while sectoral bargaining in Germany has often been criticized on 
macro grounds, some recent evidence suggests that that country’s dual system of 
industrial relations is associated with improved productivity and other outcomes.
Concern over the distributional consequences of union decline is qualified by the 
fact that unions are not always associated with narrowing, and the finding that 
changes in union density may no longer be linked to redistribution. The possibility 
of a diminution in voice attendant upon union decline is potentially more serious 
(and here US labor law is a cause for concern), although some encouraging evidence 
of a growth in non-union voice was provided.
The goal of policy should be to stimulate value-enhancing choices by firms and 
workers while limiting rent-seeking. The emphasis should be upon experimentation 
and self-regulation, whereby a variety of systems, including the union option, are 
put up for adoption by the market.
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